workers with suffi cient benefi ts as they seek new jobs. This chapter provides an overview of the UI program, defi nes the problems that were the basis for the UI reform proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget, describes those proposals, and explains how they were intended to remedy the problems.
OVERVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
1 UI is designed to provide partial, temporary income support to individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own. This program is a federal-state partnership (USDOL 2017a) based on federal law, but it is administered by states under state law. Unless there is an explicit requirement or prohibition in federal law, states have great latitude to establish the parameters of their UI programs. For this reason, there is much variation among the states with respect to qualifi cation and eligibility requirements, weekly benefi t amounts, number of weeks of benefi ts, disqualifi cation provisions, taxable wages, tax rates, and many other key policy areas (Employment and Training Administration [ETA] n.d.-a).
Eligibility
Determining benefi t eligibility is a multi-step process. First, UI applicants must have suffi cient recent labor market attachment, measured by work experience, to qualify for UI benefi ts. New entrants to the labor market, reentrants after a withdrawal from the labor market, the self-employed, and genuine independent contractors are not eligible for UI because they have not recently worked in covered employment positions. In general, prior to becoming unemployed, applicants must have earned suffi cient amounts working in covered employment during at least two calendar quarters in a 12-month period to qualify for benefi ts.
2 Traditionally, states would examine earnings during the fi rst four of the most recently completed fi ve calendar quarters when making what is called a "monetary determination." Recognizing that using this period of time (i.e., the "base period") as a basis for establishing UI eligibility does not take into account up to the most recent six months of an individual's work history, many states have begun to use an alternative base period that examines earnings during the most recent four completed calendar quarters when making a monetary determination (Mastri et al. 2016) . 3 Next, a determination must be made that the applicant was separated from employment (i.e., became unemployed) through no fault of their own. The classic example of this is when an employer lays someone off because work is no longer available. However, under certain circumstances, if an individual quits or the employer fi res an individual they may still be eligible for benefi ts. Every state's UI law defi nes what constitutes good cause for quitting (ETA 2016a) . While all states include good cause connected with work, many states also include certain personal reasons in their defi nition. Similarly, although there are many reasons an employer may decide to fi re an employee, individuals generally would be disqualifi ed from receiving UI benefi ts only if they were fi red for work-related misconduct.
After the initial eligibility determination is made, applicants must demonstrate their continued attachment to the labor market by meeting a set of ongoing eligibility requirements each week that they claim benefi ts. These include being able to work, being available for work, and actively seeking work. Refl ecting workforce behavior from decades ago, even if individuals earned/worked enough in part-time employment to qualify for benefi ts, many states continue to require individuals to be available for and seek full-time work to be eligible for benefi ts due to the presumption that individuals who work part time do not have a genuine attachment to the labor market.
Financing
The UI program is funded primarily through federal and state taxes assessed on employers. 4 In general, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) eff ective tax rate is 0.6 percent (ETA 2016b) 5 on the fi rst $7,000 of workers' earnings (Griffi n 1999). 6 The full FUTA tax is 6.0 percent, but employers get a credit of up to 5.4 percent if the state's UI law conforms to federal UI law and the state has no long-term outstanding federal advances (loans) to pay benefi ts. FUTA revenue is primarily used to pay for states' costs in administering the program, benefi t costs for certain programs that extend (provide additional weeks of) benefi ts, and for advances to states that run out of funds to pay UI benefi ts.
State unemployment tax revenue is used to pay for "regular" benefi ts-typically up to 26 weeks of benefi ts are payable to individuals when they become unemployed. Some states provide a uniform number of weeks of benefi ts to all jobless workers who qualify. Other states provide a variable number of weeks of benefi ts whereby individuals with earnings throughout the base period will be eligible for more weeks of benefi ts than individuals with earnings during only a small part of the base period. The unemployment tax rates and the amount of wages that are subject to state unemployment taxation vary signifi cantly among the states. In addition, in all states, the state unemployment tax rate assigned in a given year varies from employer to employer based on the employer's experience with unemployment (i.e., "experience rating"). Employer accounts are "charged" for benefi t payments made to their former employees, and these charges are factored in when determining employer tax rates in subsequent years. In general, employers that have more former employees who receive UI benefi ts pay higher state unemployment taxes than employers with lower UI benefi t costs associated with their former employees.
The range of applicable state unemployment tax rates varies from year to year depending on the reserves the state has in its account in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) to pay future benefi ts. When the economy is strong, trust fund balances increase because there are more employers paying taxes on more employees' wages while fewer benefi t payments are made. If the state's trust fund account balance exceeds certain levels, the range of applicable rates decreases in the following year because less revenue needs to be raised. When the economy declines, trust fund balances decrease because benefi t payments go up as layoff s increase and tax revenue decreases as fewer employers pay unemployment taxes on the wages of fewer employees. If the state's trust fund account balance goes below specifi ed levels, the range of applicable rates increases in the next year so that more funds will be collected to pay for benefi ts. Thus, not only will state unemployment tax rates vary from employer to employer based on their experience with unemployment, rates also will vary from year to year based on the state's reserves in the UTF.
Advances
Unemployment Insurance is, as its name implies, a social insurance program paid as a matter of right to all individuals who meet its requirements. If a state runs out of funds to pay benefi ts, the state may borrow from the federal government 7 to continue to meet its obligations to all eligible unemployed workers. Federal advances accrue interest under certain circumstances. Since states may not use trust fund dollars to pay this interest, many states assess a separate tax on employers to cover this cost. Also, in general, should a state have outstanding federal advances as of January 1 on two consecutive calendar years, its employers' FUTA tax credit will begin to be reduced, with the resulting additional revenue being used to pay back the federal debt.
8 States may avoid the credit reduction or reduce it if certain requirements are met. 9 In short, sustained insolvency results in marked increases in employers' total unemployment-related coststhe schedule of applicable state tax rate increases and/or a solvency add-on tax may be triggered, additional state taxes to pay interest may be assessed, and net federal unemployment taxes may increase to pay down the outstanding federal advances to the state to pay benefi ts.
Solvency
Maintaining suffi cient reserves of benefi t funding is essential to mitigate the likelihood of large fl uctuations in employers' state UI tax liability from year to year, with especially large increases needed if the economy is recovering from a recession. Hence, states are encouraged to forward-fund their accounts in the UTF (U.S. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1996). The average high cost multiple (AHCM) measures state solvency. Using data from the most recent three recessions to determine high benefi t costs in a state, the AHCM measures how long the state could pay benefi ts when benefi t payment levels are high given the state's current balance in the UTF. Although it is recommended that states maintain trust fund balances suffi cient to pay benefi ts for one year at recessionary levels, there is no federal requirement concerning state solvency.
10 Because states have great latitude when designing their UI tax structures and the revenues they are expected to yield, some states have opted to follow more of a "pay as you go" model that keeps employer taxes low but does not generate enough revenue to build signifi cant reserves for use during the next economic downturn. As explained above, this can result in greater volatility in the state and federal unemployment tax payments that employers are required to make.
Extended Benefi ts
Recognizing that during recessionary periods regular state UI benefi ts provide insuffi cient income support for many unemployed workers, the federal-state Extended Benefi ts (EB) program is intended to provide for additional weeks of UI benefi ts when unemployment is high and rising.
11 Benefi t costs are shared equally by the state and federal government.
12 EB is "triggered" when states' unemployment rates exceed certain levels and are higher than they had been in recent years. All states must have an EB trigger based on the insured unemployment rate (IUR), which is based on data concerning individuals who are currently receiving regular UI benefi ts. To trigger on, the 13-week IUR must be at least 5 percent and be at least 120 percent of the rate for the equivalent 13-week period in each of the preceding two calendar years. Under the IUR trigger, individuals may receive up to 13 additional weeks of benefi ts. If a state uses an optional total unemployment rate (TUR) trigger, which uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) household survey data about individuals who are not working and have looked for work during the last four weeks, individuals may receive up to 13 or 20 weeks of additional benefi ts, depending on the state's TUR. Up to 13 weeks of benefi ts would be available if the state's three-month TUR is at least 6.5 percent and at least 110 percent of the rate for the corresponding three-month period in either of the two previous calendar years. A total of up to 20 weeks of benefi ts would be available if the state's three-month TUR is at least 8.0 percent and the rate meets the 110 percent "lookback" requirement. Because these triggers are not very responsive to economic downturns and states historically have not been triggering EB during recessions (or not triggering on soon enough), especially via the IUR trigger, special federal programs have been created to provide additional weeks of benefi ts to unemployed workers.
Reemployment
Although providing benefi ts to individuals unemployed through no fault of their own is the overall mission of the UI program, there has been an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of helping individuals who receive UI benefi ts to become reemployed since the program's inception. Whereas some workers maintain their attachment to their jobs (i.e., they are on a temporary layoff ), most do not. It is for this reason that federal law requires UI payments to be made through public Employment Offi ces. 13 Thus, in the past, when unemployed workers had to go in person to apply for UI benefi ts, those who were not job attached would be referred for assistance fi nding work to the Employment Service, which was colocated with local UI offi ces. As UI claims taking moved out of local offi ces in the 1990s and was increasingly handled over the phone or via the Internet, the connection to public Employment Offi ces weakened in some states. To strengthen this connection, several strategies have been implemented, including the development of the UI Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) program. Since 2005, funds have been appropriated to the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) to enable states to address the individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, and to prevent and detect improper benefi t payments by reviewing their eligibility for benefi ts (ETA 2016c). The results have been positive with respect to reducing the number of weeks claimed and compensated, the likelihood of exhausting UI benefi ts, and improper payments (Benus et al. 2008 ). Due to its early successes, REA funding was increased. The program was renamed Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA), which refl ects a narrower focus on individuals who are most likely to be long-term unemployed (and on those who transitioned out of the military). Recognizing the need for increased reemployment services for these individuals, RESEA funding may now be used for this purpose. In February 2018, explicit permanent statutory authority for RESEA was included in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.
Short-Time Compensation
When tackling the problem of unemployment, increasing emphasis has been given to implementing strategies that avoid layoff s. Starting in 1982, federal UI law permitted states to experiment with short-time compensation (STC), also known as work sharing, which provides a partial UI weekly payment to certain individuals whose work hours were reduced.
14 This is noteworthy because such individuals normally wouldn't be eligible for any weekly UI payment because they earned too much money. Authority to run STC programs became permanent in 1992. 15 While not all states operate STC programs, there has been increasing recognition of its value. By reducing hours of work for a group of employees rather than laying off a portion of them, employers maintain their skilled workforce and no one loses their job. The workers meanwhile experience a smaller reduction in their earnings because they receive a reduced UI payment. For these reasons, STC is considered a win-win situation. 16, 17 Interest in STC heightened during the Great Recession, and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 included several provisions designed to encourage more states to enact STC laws and for existing STC states to expand their programs (ETA n.d.-b) . These provisions include two measures: 1) reimbursing states for up to three years of STC benefi t costs, and 2) providing grants to states for implementation or improved administration of STC programs and for promotion of and enrollment of employers in STC programs. Sixteen states received grant funds totaling $46,154,004. As a result of these off erings, the STC program has grown and strengthened (Bennicci and Wandner 2015) .
Integrity
An operational area that has received increasing attention and emphasis in recent years concerns integrity.
18 This is a broad undertaking that includes eff orts to ensure that employers are paying the proper amount of unemployment taxes as well as eff orts to prevent, detect, and recover improper benefi t payments. These eff orts have been central to the UI program for quite some time, but new challenges have arisen as the claim-taking process moved out of local offi ces due to advances in technology. These technological advances, however, have also provided more tools to help states in their eff orts to combat these challenges. For example, states cross-match claim information with information in their state directories of new hires for the purpose of fi nding individuals who continue to claim UI benefi ts after they return to work. In addition, under certain limited circumstances, states may recover improper UI benefi t payments by off setting federal income tax refunds due to the individual.
DATA: A SNAPSHOT OF THE PROGRAM
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The UI reform proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget addressed several key policy areas: solvency, benefi t adequacy, extended benefi ts, reemployment, short-time compensation, and integrity. Before discussing the specifi cs of these proposals, it is essential to provide both the high-level context and a broad description of the state of the UI program, which help defi ne the problems that the proposals were designed to address.
Unemployment
Unemployment is a lagging indicator, so the national TUR peaked in June 2009 as the Great Recession ended (Figure 2 .1). As economic recovery continued, job growth exceeded and TUR dropped below prerecessionary levels. These data are quite compelling, but they do not tell the entire story (BLS 2009). Although the economy continued growing and there were increasing opportunities for workers, signifi cant challenges remained. For example, consistent with changes at the national level, TUR declined in most states (Figure 2 .2), but it remained markedly higher than the national average in some states. In addition, long-term unemployment remained a persistent challenge (Ghayad 2013 ) even as economic recovery continued (Figure 2. 3). For example, in September 2016, 24.9 percent of the unemployed (2.0 million people) had been unemployed for more than 27 weeks.
UI Benefi ts
Consistent with the long-term unemployment data, the average number of weeks an individual receives UI benefi ts (i.e., "duration") increased. Historically, the average duration of UI benefi t receipt has varied consistently with changes in TUR, but the average duration of UI benefi t receipt did not decline as much as would have been expected when TUR declined ( Figure 2 .4). There are many possible reasons for this, including insuffi cient job growth, proportionately more permanent layoff s, and a mismatch between worker skills and emerging employer needs. When an individual initially establishes eligibility for UI benefi ts, the state UI agency issues a "fi rst payment." As expected, the number of fi rst payments has varied, consistent with changes in TUR ( Figure  2 .5). However, increasingly, the percentage of individuals who were eligible for and claimed UI benefi ts (i.e., claimants) and who received everything to which they were entitled (i.e., they "exhausted" benefi ts) did not track with changes in TUR and exceeded the exhaustion rates of prior recessions (Figure 2 .6). This was probably due to both SOURCE: USDOL/BLS data. the increase in long-term unemployment and the fact that, with the maximum number of weeks of UI benefi ts having been cut in several states (see Table 2 .1), individuals exhausted benefi ts earlier in their unemployment spell than they previously would have.
Evidence of the declining role of the program can be found when comparing UI claims data with the size of the civilian labor force and the TUR. The number of weeks of UI benefi ts claimed is expected to vary cyclically as TUR rises and falls. However, it would also be expected that, as the civilian labor force increases and with everything else being equal, the number of weeks of regular UI benefi ts claimed would increase because the pool of workers who may lose their jobs is increasing. However, as Figure 2 .7 shows, this has not been the case. The trend in weeks of regular UI benefi ts claimed, other than the spikes during recessionary periods, is fl at. Overall, the number of weeks claimed remained constant while the civilian labor force increased. When data about the percentage of unemployed workers who received UI benefi ts (i.e., the "recipiency rate") are examined, it becomes increasingly evident that, over time, fewer unemployed workers have been accessing UI benefi ts when they lose their jobs (Figure 2.8) . As noted earlier, not everyone who loses their job is eligible for benefi ts. It would be expected that when the economy is in a downturn, layoff s become the dominant form of unemployment, and proportionately fewer individuals will become unemployed because they were fi red for misconduct connected with work or because they 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Percent quit their jobs without good cause. Thus, recipiency rates would increase during recessions because proportionately more individuals become unemployed because they were laid off (i.e., because of a lack of work). However, as shown in Figure 2 .8, the UI recipiency rate nationwide plummeted to less than 30 percent and was lower than it had been at similar points during economic recoveries in recent decades. State-level data are even more striking. Because states have much discretion with respect to determining who is potentially eligible for UI benefi ts, it is not surprising that there is huge variation among the states with respect to recipiency rates. As shown in Figure 2 .9, in the second quarter of calendar year 2016, the range of recipiency rates among the states went from less than 10 percent to more than 65 percent, with a national average of 28.6 percent. ND  VT  AK  MA  NJ  WY  PA  CA  WV  MN  CT  NY  HI  MT  TX  CO  AR  DE  DC  ME  IA  RI  OR  OK  WI  IL  MI  KS  NV  MD  NM  WA  KY  ID  OH  VA  NH  UT  MO  PR  AZ  NE  AL  IN  MS  SD  LA  GA  SC  TN 
UI Taxes and Solvency
The UI program is intended to operate counter-cyclically, with benefi t payments increasing during economic downturns and funding reserves being built up when unemployment is low. Figure 2 .10 shows how state tax rates, contributions (taxes) collected, and benefi ts paid varied since 2000 and the impact these factors had on trust fund balances. During the Great Recession, when trust fund balances were negative, most states borrowed from the federal government. In total, 36 states borrowed and the peak amount of the advances was $47.2 billion (Figure 2 .11).
The primary reason for this impact on the trust fund was the severity of the Great Recession-some states would have become insolvent no matter how well they prepared in advance. However, SOURCE: USDOL/OUI, USDOL/BLS, U.S. Bureau of Public Debt data. the data demonstrate that had more states achieved an adequate level of solvency beforehand, fewer states would have run out of benefi t funds and borrowing levels would have been much lower for the states whose economies were hard hit by the recession. The AHCM is the federal measure of state solvency, where an AHCM of 1.0 means that a state has a trust fund balance suffi cient to pay benefi ts for one year during a recessionary period. 20 Only about one-third of the states had an AHCM of at least 1.0 when the recession began (Figure 2.12 ). There were a few states that met this solvency standard that still borrowed from the federal government to pay UI benefi ts, but most of the states that borrowed did not meet the standard (Figure 2.13) .
Between the economic recovery and the actions states took to increase revenue and decrease expenditures, there have been marked improvements in solvency in recent years. However, as of 2015 a couple of states still had outstanding UI debt, and most states (includ- NOTE: An AHCM of 1.0 (the gray line) means that a state has a trust fund balance suffi cient to pay benefi ts for one year during a recessionary period. SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data. ing all large states) did not have an AHCM of at least 1.0, calling into question their readiness for the next recession (Figure 2 .14).
UI Benefi t Adequacy
Although there are no federal standards regarding the adequacy of UI benefi ts, there has been a long-standing recommendation that the weekly benefi t amount (WBA) replace at least 50 percent of lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum WBA equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly wage (AWW) (U.S. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1996). At the national level, not only has that recommendation not been met during the last 40 years, there is a long-term declining trend in the replacement rate (Figure 2.15) .
Another way to examine benefi t adequacy is to examine recipiency rates (Figures 2.8 and 2.9 ). Of the many factors that infl uence this rate, UI eligibility requirements, disqualifi cation provisions, and the number of weeks of benefi ts available are among the most important. In recent years, several states enacted laws (ETA n.d.-c) that restrict access to the program in a multitude of ways, including raising qualifying earnings requirements, broadening the scope of what constitutes misconduct connected with work, and increasing the requirements needed to overcome a disqualifi cation and reestablish eligibility for UI benefi ts. In addition, several states cut the maximum number of weeks of UI benefi ts (Table 2.1). In the past, states generally off ered up to 26 weeks of benefi ts. About one-quarter of the states now off er fewer than 26 weeks. In several states, the maximum available depends on the unemployment rate. For example, in North Carolina, as few as 12 weeks of benefi ts will be available under certain circumstances. As should be evident from the above discussion, the UI program has deviated from historical standards and its original goals, resulting in an erosion of the social safety net for jobless workers. The proposals detailed in the following section were designed to address several of the most important causes of these problems.
BUDGET PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS
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Solvency
From the brief examination of the data in the previous section, it should be clear that states are not prepared for the next recession because they don't have suffi cient funds to pay benefi ts when demands are high. Most states' UTF accounts do not meet the federal NOTE: An AHCM of 1.0 (the gray line) means that a state has a trust fund balance suffi cient to pay benefi ts for one year during a recessionary period. SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data. WY  OK  MS  OR  UT  NE  SD  AK  MT  WA  LA  VT  ID  IA  HI  NH  ME  MN  PR  DC  FL  TN  KS  MD  MI  AL  ND  AR  NM  VA  NC  CO  GA  NV  WI  IL  SC  DE  MO  NJ  TX  MA  RI  WV  PA  AZ  NY  CT  IN  KY  OH  CA  VI solvency recommendation. The FY 2017 Obama Budget recognized the importance of states having suffi cient reserves to pay benefi ts, to avoid borrowing, and to avoid large increases in employer taxes when economic conditions are weak or recovering, so it included a set of legislative proposals to address solvency. First, in 2017, it would have restored the 0.2 percent FUTA surtax, which would help the federal accounts in the UTF pay their outstanding debts. For example, as of November 10, 2016, the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account owed $7.2 billion to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury and $7.5 billion to the Federal Unemployment Account. Since the amount of wages subject to unemployment taxation at the state level is closely related to the corresponding amount at the federal level, there was also a proposal to increase the federal taxable wage base to $40,000 in 2018 (at present, it is $7,000) and to index it to infl ation in subsequent years. By itself, this would have a limited eff ect on state SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data. Replacement rate (%) $ Average weekly wage Average weekly benefit Replacement rate solvency, but it was expected that the change would encourage states to take action to improve their solvency. However, it would have more equitably allocated the tax burden among employers. When a taxable wage base is low, employers with more low-wage or part-time workers pay unemployment taxes on a larger portion of employee earnings than employers with more high-wage or full-time workers.
An additional proposal would have required states to impose a minimum tax per employee equal to 0.175 percent of taxable wages, thereby spreading the cost of UI more widely among all employers.
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At present, many states allow a signifi cant portion of employers with the best unemployment "experience" to pay a zero tax rate. Not only does this hamper eff orts to improve solvency, but it undermines the fundamental principle of insurance-paying a premium to insure against the risk of an event occurring, in this case, the risk of unemployment. As it is for other types of insurance, premiums refl ect the likelihood of an event happening. However, contributions are made on behalf of everyone covered by the insurance because everyone has the benefi t of potential access to funds if the insured event occurs.
Another proposal to help states attain solvency in the FY 2017 budget was to reduce the FUTA credit available to employers when a state had an AHCM of less than 0.5 on January 1 in two consecutive years, with the additional amounts paid being used to bolster the state's account in the UTF. This process would be similar to that used to reduce FUTA credit to help states pay back their outstanding advances to pay UI benefi ts.
To avoid a massive federal tax increase when the federal taxable wage base increases, the proposal would have decreased the eff ective FUTA tax rate to 0.167 percent. However, FUTA revenue would have gradually increased over time as the federal taxable wage base increased after indexing. This would have mitigated the likelihood of future borrowing from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury, because the administrative and benefi ts costs paid from the federal accounts in the UTF would increase over time as well.
Benefi t Adequacy
As described above, UI claims have plummeted. They have reached the lowest level since the 1970s. For example, in October 2016, initial claims were below 300,000 for more than 85 consecutive weeks-the longest streak since 1970 (USDOL 2016). Although much of the reduction in claims is due to improving economic conditions, actions by several states to cut benefi ts and restrict eligibility also were factors. For this reason, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included a set of proposals designed to expand access to UI benefi ts and services. First, it would have established the following federal requirements:
• States must provide at least 26 weeks of benefi ts for the regular program.
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• States must adopt the following three provisions for which UI Modernization incentive payments were made available under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA):
1) Use an alternative base period.
2) Allow benefi ts to individuals who seek part-time employment.
3) Allow unemployed workers to be eligible for benefi ts if they leave their jobs for family reasons.
Increasing the number of weeks of benefi ts back to the historic norm is important because it takes time for an individual to fi nd a job, even in a good economy. Moreover, it is benefi cial to both the individual worker and the economy as a whole if workers are able to take the time to fi nd jobs that align well with their skills, education, and experience. These workers would be able to increase their contributions to society, as well as better provide for themselves and their families. Additional weeks of UI benefi ts would also result in increased macroeconomic stabilization.
To understand the importance of the alternative base period proposal, it is important to note the history and evolution of monetary determinations. Before employers began reporting their employees' quarterly earnings to the states (ETA 1984) , the UI base period used to determine whether an individual earned enough to qualify for benefi ts was generally the most recent 52 weeks before the individual fi led a claim. Although this procedure was more administratively challenging because states had to contact employers to get this information about each individual applying for UI benefi ts, it more accurately captured the individual's recent attachment to the workforce. When states transitioned to establishing eligibility based on quarterly wage reports, administrative necessity forced states to use more remote work experience when making this determination. Before electronic reporting was possible, employers had to mail paper copies of wage information. Given the lag between when a calendar quarter ended and when the state could reasonably expect to have wage information from most employers, states opted to consider wages earned during the fi rst four of the most recent fi ve completed calendar quarters. As technology has advanced and employers report increasingly sooner after the end of the calendar quarter, this administrative constraint has largely disappeared. Therefore, administrative issues such as this should no longer be the deciding factor for a UI benefi t eligibility requirement. Using the most recent available reported earnings data more accurately measures a worker's present attachment to the workforce and should be the basis for determining who qualifi es for UI benefi ts (Carr 2016) . As of 2016, 37 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands already used alternative base periods when making monetary determinations (ETA 2016b).
The remaining proposed requirements were designed to help the UI program better refl ect the twenty-fi rst century economy. In the 1930s, the single breadwinner model was typical for most familiesvery diff erent from today's conditions. With that construct in mind, and with the intent to design a program that provided benefi ts only to individuals who became and remained unemployed involuntarily, individuals who left their jobs for personal reasons or who were only working part time were not considered to be genuinely attached to the labor force. While the risk that is insured by the UI program today remains the same-involuntary unemployment-the way in which that concept is defi ned should be reexamined. In particular, with an increasing number of two-earner families, the meaning of labor-force attachment has changed. For example, it is hard to argue that quitting a job to move across the country when a spouse's job necessitates the move is voluntary. Maintaining a family unit is paramount and does not equate with a decision to leave the workforce. In this type of circumstance, since the individual's employer did not cause the unemployment, the UI benefi ts paid may be "non-charged" (i.e., won't be taken into account when determining the employer's state unemployment tax rate). 24 However, denying benefi ts to such individuals would be inconsistent with the goals of the UI programs and the values of our society.
Similarly, regardless of economic necessity or overall preference, the demands of family life or older workers' transition to retirement 25 often require some individuals to work part time. This does not automatically equate with a weak or casual connection to the workforce. For this reason, if individuals earn enough to qualify for UI benefi ts and meet all other requirements, making them ineligible because they are only available for part-time work also would be out of line with the principles upon which the UI program is based (Michaelides and Mueser 2009) .
The FY 2017 Obama Budget also provided for a new $5 billion Modernization Fund. To become eligible for its share of funds, a state would have had to:
• allow for broader federal access to wage records;
• adopt employer electronic fi ling and/or increased penalties for employer nonreporting; and
• have a defi nition of "misconduct" that conforms to a USDOL model.
In recent years, UI wage records are increasingly being used to evaluate and measure the performance of a vast array of public programs. Evidence-based decision making regarding investment of public funds requires access to high-quality, comprehensive data, which is why the fi rst two prerequisites were chosen.
When determining whether individuals became unemployed through no fault of their own, the state must decide whether the reason an employee was fi red was "misconduct connected with work," which would disqualify them from receiving benefi ts-typically for their entire spell of unemployment. Although there are many reasons why an employer may legitimately and legally fi re a worker, only a small subset of those reasons would constitute misconduct connected with work. Historically, states generally defi ned misconduct connected with work narrowly in line with the defi nition in Boynton Cab Co. V. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249 (Wis. 1941):
Some states have signifi cantly broadened the defi nition of misconduct connected with work, which has had the eff ect of disqualifying more workers from receiving UI benefi ts. To be eligible for its share of the Modernization Fund, a state's defi nition would have to conform to the federal defi nition.
In addition to the prerequisite requirements, to receive a Modernization Fund payment, states would have had to adopt one benefi t expansion and two pro-work reforms. The benefi t expansions were: 1) allow more individuals to receive UI benefi ts while participating in training;
2) provide a maximum WBA equal to at least two-thirds of the state's AWW during the most recent 12 months; or 3) improve eligibility for temporary workers.
Recognizing that training may increase the likelihood of reemployment and the quality of the job obtained, federal UI law prohibits states from making individuals ineligible because they are not available for work or actively seeking work while they are in training approved by a state agency. 26 States would have sole authority to determine which types of training to approve for this purpose, but this proposal would have given states an incentive to expand the scope of training they approve.
The formula established in many states' UI laws to determine the WBA is generally designed to replace one-half of a worker's weekly wage (ETA 2016c) . This amount helps jobless workers meet the necessities of life without providing a disincentive to work (Chetty 2008) . However, regardless of the WBA the formula would generate based on an individual's wage history, the maximum amount is capped. In some states, the maximum WBA is a fi xed amount that can only be changed by enacting a state law. In other states, the maximum WBA changes each year because it is set as a specifi ed percentage of the AWW. Ensuring that the maximum WBA increases are consistent with increases to the state AWW avoids an erosion of benefi ts, particularly for middle income workers.
Some states establish additional requirements in order for temporary workers to be eligible for UI benefi ts. The FY2017 Obama Budget was designed to ensure that such requirements didn't become a barrier to temporary workers getting benefi ts.
States would have had to adopt two of the following fi ve prowork reforms to qualify for an incentive payment: 1) progressively more intense reemployment service delivery as duration of benefi t receipt lengthens;
2) improved reemployment services for UI claimants;
3) subsidized temporary work programs; 4) relocation assistance coupled with individual case management, in-person career counseling, provision of customized information about job opportunities, and referrals to suitable work; or 5) improved data systems for workforce and education program performance, research, and evaluation purposes.
From its inception, the UI program has been closely tied to the U.S. Employment Service 27 because, unless workers are on a temporary layoff , it is imperative to help them fi nd jobs, which is the rationale for the fi rst two options. The next two options represent alternative ways to help individuals fi nd work-via temporary work programs and relocation. The last pro-work choice was premised on workforce and education programs becoming more eff ective at giving people the knowledge and skills they needed to become reemployed if data were used more eff ectively when evaluating, researching, and assessing the performance of these programs.
Extended Benefi ts
EB does not function eff ectively because it doesn't trigger on soon enough (or at all) in states with high unemployment. Since its inception in 1970, special federal programs providing additional weeks of benefi ts were created during each major downturn and were eff ective during the periods 1972 to 1973 , 1975 to 1978 , 1982 to 1985 , 1991 to 1994 , 2002 to 2004 , and, most recently, 2008 to 2013 . Implementing these temporary federal programs poses several chal-lenges. Foremost of these, it takes too long. It takes several months for suffi cient economic information to become available to demonstrate need and design an extension program; legislation to be drafted, passed by Congress, and enacted into law; the USDOL to develop operating instructions and guidance; and the states to implement the new program. In addition, in these temporary federal programs, some portion of the benefi ts is generally available in all states, rather than targeting all benefi ts only to the states experiencing higher unemployment. Moreover, without knowing the program parameters of a new extension, states do not have suffi cient time to prepare to implement and administer these special federal programs, which leads to further delays, public confusion, and occasionally errors. In short, while providing vital benefi ts to jobless workers and their families, these ad hoc programs do not provide for effi cient and timely macroeconomic stabilization.
To obviate the need for hurried enactment of temporary federal UI extension programs, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included a proposal to reform the EB program. Specifi cally, it would have:
• Provided for four 13-week tiers of benefi ts, with availability depending on the state's TUR.
• Provided permanent 100 percent federal funding of EB with nonrepayable advances from the General Fund if there were insuffi cient amounts in the federal account in the UTF.
• Established new TUR trigger thresholds of 6.5, 7.5, 8.5, and 9.5 percent. These thresholds would have been met if the state's TUR met or exceeded one of those levels or if the total of the state's TUR and the change in the TUR from a comparable period in one of the previous two years equaled or exceeded one of those levels.
• Required reemployment services and eligibility assessments for all EB claimants.
These proposals drew largely on experience from the Great Recession-not just with EB, but also with the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program (ETA n.d.-e). At its peak, EUC was a four-tiered program providing up to 53 weeks of benefi ts, depending on the state's TUR. After the federal account ran out of funds to pay for EUC, it was paid with funds from General Revenue that did not have to be repaid. 28 The triggers changed over time. Most recently, Tier 1 had no trigger, and Tier 2 triggered on in states with a three-month TUR of at least 6.0 percent. For Tier 3, the rate was at least 7.0 percent, and for Tier 4, it was 9.0 percent.
The EB triggers failed for several reasons. First, even with the TUR-based triggers, it took too long for EB to become available in many states. The EUC program was fi rst enacted in June 2008, six months after the Great Recession began. 29 In January 2009, most states still hadn't triggered onto EB-more than one year after the recession began (ETA n.d.-f). Related to this concern is that too few states had a TUR trigger in their laws before the recession began. One of the most important EB-related provisions in ARRA was temporary 100 percent federal funding of EB.
30 As a result of the 100 percent federal funding, 29 states amended their EB laws to provide for temporary TUR triggers conditioned on 100 percent federal funding. The fi nal negative consequence of the design of the EB triggers is the fact that states with sustained high unemployment eventually triggered off EB. To remain on EB, a state's TUR must not only meet or exceed certain levels, but the rate had to be higher than it had been during comparable periods in the prior year or two. With the impact of the Great Recession lasting for such a long time, the unemployment rates in some states, while high, were not higher than they had been during the previous two years. Even though federal law was amended to allow states to use a three-year "lookback," and 33 states amended their laws to provide for it, the longer lookback eventually became insuffi cient, and this component resulted in EB no longer being available to long-term unemployed workers in states with sustained high unemployment (ETA 2012) .
Recognizing the importance of helping individuals fi nd jobs, in particular the long-term unemployed, and ensuring that they continue to meet all eligibility requirements, the EUC program was modifi ed in 2012 to require all new EUC claimants to receive reemployment services, and reemployment and eligibility assessments (ETA n.d.-g) . This is the reason the EB proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget would have required reemployment services and eligibility assessments for all EB claimants.
Reemployment
The increases in long-term unemployment, average duration, and exhaustion rates demonstrate the need for strategies designed to assist with reemployment eff orts for individuals who become unemployed. Building on the initiative that began in 2005 in a few states and national implementation in 2012 for individuals receiving EUC, the FY 2017 Obama Budget proposed making the RESEA program a permanently authorized program that would have required all states to participate and would have provided enhanced funding to enable more individuals to be served. For the regular UI program, the onethird of new claimants who would have been identifi ed 31 as the most likely to be long-term unemployed and in need of reemployment services would have been required to participate in RESEAs as a condition of eligibility for UI benefi ts.
Recognizing the importance of helping transitioning veterans fi nd employment in the civilian labor force, the FY 2017 Obama Budget also proposed requiring all new claimants for the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers program 32 to participate in RESEAs as a condition of eligibility for UI benefi ts.
The FY 2017 budget included another proposal designed to encourage reemployment-wage insurance. Particularly for workers transitioning to new occupations, new jobs might pay signifi cantly less than the jobs individuals had prior to becoming unemployed. To provide a safety net to such workers and to encourage their swift reemployment, this wage insurance proposal would have been available to individuals who had been working for at least three years with their prior employer. If their new job paid less than $50,000 per year, workers would have received a payment equal to half the diff erence between their prior and new annual wage, up to $10,000 over a period of two years.
Short-Time Compensation
The experience during the Great Recession highlighted the importance of helping workers to keep their jobs. While many states did avail themselves of the STC-related funding opportunities in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, and a few states created new STC programs, not all did. Although there are a variety of explanations, one of the most meaningful is timing. To implement a new program requires an extensive time commitment. In 2012 and 2013, states had limited capacity to take on new initiatives, given the high workload and the complex modifi cations to the EUC program that they had to administer, among other reasons. Since economic conditions improved signifi cantly after recovery from the Great Recession, states were in a much better position to consider commencing STC programs or improving existing ones. For this reason, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included proposals to give states an additional two years of federal reimbursement of STC benefi t costs and two more years to apply for and receive STC grants. In addition, there was a proposal to make state STC benefi t costs subject to 50 percent federal reimbursement whenever the state triggered on the EB program.
Integrity
Despite states' best eff orts, many challenges remain to prevent improper payments. The FY 2017 Obama Budget included a set of highly technical proposals related to benefi t integrity that built on recent enactments. They were designed to provide states with additional resources to dedicate to this purpose and to ensure that states used all of the tools at their disposal to combat this issue. Specifi cally, they would have:
• allowed states that contracted out all information technology functions to use the Treasury Off set Program for benefi t overpayment recovery;
• required states to use an electronic system to transmit information with employers to obtain information needed to determine benefi t eligibility;
• required states to use the National Directory of New Hires to fi nd individuals who continued to claim benefi ts after returning to work and to require penalties on employers that did not report their new hires;
• allowed the USDOL to require that states whose poor program performance required creation of corrective action plans to dedicate specifi ed amounts of their administrative grants to implementing those plans, and to provide awards or incentives to states with excellent performance;
• required states to use UI penalty and interest funds for UI administration with a portion dedicated to program integrity activities;
• required states to cross-match UI claim information with the Prisoner Update Processing System to fi nd individuals who were claiming benefi ts while incarcerated; and
• allowed states to use up to 5 percent of recovered overpayments or delinquent employer contributions collected for integrity purposes rather than for future benefi t payments.
CONCLUSION
As is evident from this brief description and analysis, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included an ambitious set of UI legislative proposals that focused on many of the most profoundly meaningful aspects of the program. Opinions will certainly vary about those proposals from both a substantive policy perspective as well as from an ideological perspective. However, when considering UI's philosophical underpinnings, it should be clear that many of these proposals could bring the current UI program into better alignment with its foundational principles, given the economic, societal, and technological changes that have occurred during the more than 80 years since the inception of the UI program in 1935. Moreover, by raising the profi le of some crucial issues and setting forth a comprehensive plan for addressing them, public dialogue and debate might yet be encouraged and result in permanent positive reforms to the UI program.
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1. Although this overview addresses many key aspects of the UI program, it mainly focuses on the aspects of the program pertinent to the reform proposals discussed in this paper. It is not comprehensive and is intended to provide the information necessary to understand the issues that presently exist and how the proposals were intended to address them. 2. Washington State does not determine UI eligibility based on earning wages equal to or exceeding a specifi ed amount. Instead, state law requires an individual to have at least 680 hours of base period employment.
3. Following the enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 23 states enacted new or modifi ed existing alternative base periods. 4. Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania levy nominal UI taxes on workers under certain limited circumstances. In Alaska, the tax rate is equal to 27 percent of the average benefi t cost rate, but not less than 0.5 percent or more than 1.0 percent of taxable wages. In New Jersey, the tax rate is 0.3825 percent. Depending on the adequacy of the fund balance in a given year, Pennsylvania employees pay contributions ranging from 0.0 percent to 0.08 percent of total gross covered wages earned in employment. 5. Until June 2011, the FUTA tax was 6.2 percent and the eff ective FUTA tax rate was 0.8 percent. A 0.2 percent "surtax" was originally added in 1985 to help the federal accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) pay back their advances from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. Between advances to states and federal benefi t spending during the Great Recession, the federal accounts in the UTF ran out of funds and had to borrow to meet all obligations. 6. At the onset of the program, the FUTA tax was 1.0 percent on total wages with an eff ective rate of 0.1 percent. In 1939, the FUTA taxable wage base was set at $3,000, which exceeded the annual wages of 98 percent of workers. According to USDOL estimates, FUTA taxable wages in 2015 represented less than 17 percent of total wages in the United States. 7. States may use other state funds or may borrow from other sources to pay UI benefi ts. During the Great Recession, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas borrowed via bonding. On December 31, 2013, the outstanding bond amount for these states was $9.725 billion. 8. If on November 10 of the year in which on a second consecutive January 1 a state has a remaining outstanding Title XII advance balance, the state's FUTA credits will begin to be reduced in the subsequent year to repay the outstanding debt. 9. The state must apply for and be found eligible for relief from tax credit reduction in the form of avoidance or a cap on reduction (26 U.S.C. 3302 and Social Security Act, Section 901(d) (1) USDOL (2017b) . 22. To a certain extent, this is an inherent design feature of insurance. It generally is not expected that premiums would cover the full cost of the benefi ts. However, it is widely acknowledged that excessive levels of socialized costs due to ineff ective charging and insuffi cient maximum tax rates to refl ect employer experience with unemployment result in some employers paying for a smaller portion of benefi ts than others. Also, it is important to note that for UI purposes, certain entities are permitted to self-insure. State or local governmental entities, 501(c)(3) nonprofi t organizations, and Indian tribes may opt to reimburse benefi t costs rather than be assessed a contribution rate. 23. Regular benefi ts are paid at the beginning of a spell of unemployment. This is in contrast to programs like EB, which are available to individu-als who exhaust entitlement to regular benefi ts in states whose unemployment rate exceeds certain levels. 24. Consistent with the insurance principle of the UI program, states have been allowed to have "non-charged" UI benefi t payments when the employer is not at fault for the spell of unemployment. A typical reason has been when benefi t payments are made to individuals who quit for good personal cause. 25. Older workers increasingly are taking part-time "bridge jobs" after they leave their career jobs and before they fully retire. 26. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Section 3304(a)(8 EB costs continued to be funded by FUTA revenue in the EUC Account. When those funds were depleted, the federal accounts in the UTF borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to meet its obligations. 31. Federal law presently requires states to operate the worker profi ling and reemployment services program, which identifi es claimants likely to exhaust benefi ts and need reemployment services to fi nd work, and requires such individuals to participate in those services as a condition of UI eligibility. 32. Since state UI programs do not cover individuals who work for the federal government, there are separate federal UI programs to provide benefi ts to such workers when they become unemployed. States administer these programs under an agreement with the USDOL. One such program is Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers.
